Jacob Vangeest is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism at Western University in London, ON, Canada, who is specializing in 20th century French philosophy, cultural studies, and political thought. His doctoral research focuses on the political ramifications of the ontological commitment to entanglement and individuation as positioned in discourse of critical posthumanism and the philosophies of becoming. Jacob has authored and co-authored several academic articles, including “Human, all too human? Anthropocene narratives, posthumanism and the problem of ‘post-anthropocentrism’” with Nandita Biswas Mellamphy in The Anthropocene Review, and “Forest Semiosis: Plant Noesis as Negantropic Potential” in Footprint: Delft Architecture Theory Journal. His doctoral dissertation, “Critical Post-humanism as Problem: Gestures of Political Ontology, Embodied Ethics, and Anti-Teleology,” focuses the ontological, epistemological, and ethical formulation of ‘critical posthumanism’ as a critique of standard humanistic discourse. Currently, he is working on two projects: a study of the ontological and political ramifications of Alan Moore’s Saga of the Swamp Thing, and a study focused on the relationship of climate change, artificial intelligence, and humanity. Jacob currently resides in Portland, OR, United States with his wife Margot and child Johan. When he isn’t wildly speculating on the limits of {post}humanity, he enjoys hiking, coffee shops, book stores, film and running.
Research
My research takes place in the fields of critical theory, continental philosophy, and social and political thought. Over the last few years, I have largely focused on the intersection of these areas with emerging discourses of critical posthumanism. This term, as defined in the work of Jill Didur, attempts to conceive a more relational epistemology and ontology. Where ‘humanism’ grounds knowledge in a figure who is separated from and able to reflect on ‘nature,’ critical posthumanism argues humanity is embedded in and persistently affected by ‘nature,’ requiring a different epistemology and alternative ontological grounds. This alternative has adopted many names, including ‘embeddedness,’ ‘intra-connection,’ ‘symbiogenesis,’ ‘trans-corporeality,’ and ‘transversal interconnection.’ Over the last few years, I have been working to think through these developments with the aim of problematizing and emboldening this discourse.
In retrospect, I would identify two trajectories of this undertaking. The first is to bring work from thinkers like Bernard Stiegler and Gilbert Simondon into conversation with critical posthumanism (which has largely grounded itself in the work of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze). The way Stiegler and Simondon conceive of relation provides a useful support to how relational ontology is conceived in critical posthumanism. Rather than adopt a flat ontological perspective (as some critical posthumanists have done, following a reading of Deleuze inspired by Manuel Delanda), or a holistic ontology (where ‘the web of being’ or ‘zoe’ come to function close to totality), these thinkers of transduction provide a strong philosophical basis for conceiving relation between distinct spheres of being without collapsing their distinctions in a dialectical sublation. Here, I am particularly interested in thinking about how thinkers like Rosi Braidotti and Karen Barad might both agree with and benefit from engagement with thinkers like Stiegler and Simondon.
The second trajectory has been critical of critical posthumanism for not going far enough in its critique of humanism. This has largely been the focus of my dissertation. Specifically, I have been interested in whether the critiques of humanism are sufficient to overcome humanism. Largely, I have argued that while the positions rendered by critical posthumanism are necessary, they are not yet sufficient. In my dissertation, I suggest that while the critical posthumanism offers a clear alternative to Immanuel Kant, it does not yet do enough to show its distinction from the work of G.W.F. Hegel, who many in the discourse consider a humanist. Here, my interest is in attempting to think about what it would mean to overcome humanism. Primarily, is it possible to put forward such a project without relying on humanistic principles of rationalism and teleology? Is it possible to determine a normative or political ontological position without a rational appeal to ends? In addition to my dissertation, I have begun to think about these issues considering both artificial intelligence and the Anthropocene. Work in the latter category is most notably seen in a work co-written with Nandita Biswas Mellamphy titled “Human All too Human? Anthropocene Narratives, Posthumanisms, and the Problem of ‘Post-Anthropocentrism.’”
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